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Review Essay
The Age of Aquarius
or,
How I (Almost) Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love Free Markets
Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power
of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity.
By Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Crown Business,
2003.
Reviewed by Lawrence E. Mitchell
t
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales tell a beautiful story
beautifully told.' It is a story of harmony and understanding,
peace and prosperity. It is a story that shows the way for citi-
zens of the world to join hands across their borders and usher
in a new age of universal happiness. It is also a story of re-
demption, in which the despised financier, immortalized by the
fictional Sherman McCoy and Gordon Gecko and the very real
Michael Milken, are shown to be the true prophets of this new
age. It is a story that implores us to abandon our fears and
prejudices, our knee-jerk reactions to the superficial coldness of
free-market capitalism, accept its intrinsic beauty, and work
together to bring about this Age of Aquarius.
The story casts Rajan and Zingales as latter-day Adam
Smiths, condemning the conspiratorial haves of the capitalist
order as nefariously preventing the dawning of this new era in
order to protect their positions of power and wealth, and fore-
t John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, The George Washing-
ton University Law School. My thanks go to Theresa Gabaldon and Dalia
Tsuk, and to Christi Denecke and Jen Kwon for their superb research assis-
tance.
1. RAGHuRAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM
THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO
CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003).
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closing the opportunities that free markets can create for all, in
fear that truly free markets will, as they have to some signifi-
cant extent, shake up the old order and make these dukes of
the dollar actually work for their money, and operate in a way
that enhances efficiency rather than constrains it. It is the
capitalists themselves-here cast as entrenched industrialists
and wealthy heirs-who prevent the full flowering of capital-
ism. It is McCoy, Gecko, Milken, and the other members of the
merry band who inhabit that Sherwood Forest known as Wall
Street who will liberate us and the markets we need from this
tyranny.
Enough of mixed metaphors. There is much truth to this
story. Rajan and Zingales, following the insights not only of
economists but, at least implicitly, of sociological giants like C.
Wright Mills2 and William Whyte,3 tell a tale of an earlier age
of hierarchy-an era in which the mid-century industrialists
stifled the capital markets that were beginning to flourish be-
fore the Depression, and created vertically integrated indus-
trial monoliths that funneled wealth and power into and to the
top of hierarchical structures, constraining managers and
skilled workers by drying up sources of capital which might
have allowed them to become entrepreneurs, and even limiting
their career mobility by channeling their skillsinto highly spe-
cialized and company-specific roles.4 Rajan and Zingales, with
unusual psychological sensitivity for practitioners of a disci-
pline that, until recently, eschewed anything resembling a psy-
chological insight,5 understand the fear that motivated the in-
dustrialists, the fear that the kind of competition characteristic
of free markets might well dethrone them, and the economic,
political, and institutional steps they took to preserve their
power.6 Rajan and Zingales accurately, and without losing so-
2. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); C. WRIGHT MILLS,
WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1951).
3. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
4. For the leading accounts of industrial development that gave rise to
this period, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS
OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
5. The insights have been around for decades. See the collection of arti-
cles in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993).
Only recently have they made significant inroads into neoclassical analysis.
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE (2000).
6. For an economical historical account arguing that American public
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phistication in a book that is artfully written for a general au-
dience, detail what they see as the heroic history of modern fi-
nance, from Harry Markowitz's development of portfolio theory7
to the rise of financial intermediaries that dramatically in-
creased the ability of citizens of developed countries to partici-
pate in capital markets and not only enhanced the efficiency of
those markets but, in so doing, began to force apart the hierar-
chical structures built to constrain them.
The power of the market is undeniable. It has caused the
collapse of what I refer to as "the age of hierarchy," created en-
trepreneurial opportunity, opened avenues of participation for
those who were repressed during the age of hierarchy (like
women and minorities), and led to wonderful new technologies
that have the potential, some of which already has been real-
ized, to create a world of economic opportunity for all.9 What I
term, and Rajan and Zingales celebrate, as "the age of mar-
kets," in contrast to the age of hierarchy, is no respecter of posi-
tion and place. The age of markets respects ideas, energy, and
enterprise. Implicit in this story is the deep and abiding belief
that the age of markets is the ultimate realization of democracy
throughout much of the world.10
Rajan and Zingales are refreshing. This is neoclassical eco-
nomic theory with soul. It is clear throughout the book, as it is
from their prior work, that these two care deeply about the
economic injustices of the world and want to change it. They
policy through much of the twentieth century opposed big finance, see MARK J.
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
7. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
8. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY:
AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 165-66 (2001). The recently repealed Glass-
Steagall Act and the securities legislation of 1933 and 1934 were early at-
tempts to break up financial institutional power. Roe is particularly instruc-
tive on this point. ROE, supra note 6.
9. I explore the transformation from the age of hierarchy to the age of
markets and the accompanying benefits and social dislocations more deeply in
an untitled book-in-progress.
10. Rajan and Zingales imply not only that the markets are democratic,
but that they tend to help sustain democratic institutions. Cf RAJAN &
ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 16, 132, 164. While it is hard to quibble with the
assertion that markets, in their ideal form, are democratic, I will later explore
the anti-democratic effects of the market in several iterations. See infra pp.
928-33. It is also the case that free market capitalism does not necessarily go
hand in hand with democracy, as the case of Singapore demonstrates, and as
is also demonstrated by the increasingly capitalistic People's Republic of
China.
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downplay the parsimonious description so prized by their col-
leagues-the narrow search for wealth of homo economicus-
and show us, with real normative insight, how the dismal sci-
ence can ennoble human life, even if that life ultimately pro-
ceeds from motives of self-interest. Their project brings to mind
Richard Posner's failed attempt to show how the wealth maxi-
mization principle is reducible to a form of Kantian morality.11
But unlike Posner, and more successfully I think, Rajan and
Zingales believe that they do not need a deontological apology
for neoclassical economics. They see no need to twist theory to
link it with the great moral traditions of the West, for the
moral justification of their project is clear on every page: liber-
ate finance and the world will be a happier place.
Their argument is so lovely, and so well-motivated, that
even a curmudgeonly lifelong critic of free markets like myself
can hardly help but feel uplifted. That is, as long as one takes
their argument on their own terms. And, to be fair, this is the
kind of book in which they are entitled to make the argument
on their own terms. Sophisticated as it is, this is a book written
for a popular audience, not an academic one, and Rajan and
Zingales take full advantage of their liberation from academic
conventions to make the case they want to make." They see
relatively little need to address the critics, no reason to probe
every argument in the literature, and in this they are justified.
But they embrace their liberation with a vengeance. Rajan and
Zingales tell a good story. The problem is that, rather quickly,
their story begins to resemble a fairy tale. It is Othello without
lago,"1 a Mozart sonata without the fleeting shift to minor in
the recapitulation, 4 The Sun Also Rises without Jake's debili-
tating injury.15 And so, swept along as I was by their enthusi-
asm and intelligence, I finished the book recalling Jake's final
line to Brett, in which he responds to her speculation as to how
11. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
12. This is not to say that the book is not grounded in serious scholarship.
Many of the arguments they make appear in a series of articles they have
written separately and together, some of which are cited throughout this es-
say.
13. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (Philip Brockbank ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1984).
14. See, e.g., W.A. Mozart, Sonata for Piano in F Major, KV 332 (300k),
Allegro, measures 216-218.
15. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES (Collier Books 1986)
(1926).
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wonderful their relationship might have been: "Isn't it pretty to
think so?" 16 Despite their denials of ideology (and their very
real attempts to avoid it), Rajan and Zingales are so committed
to the free market ideal that they fail to see the full effect of the
deformities, even while acknowledging those deformities exist
and suggesting ways of remedying them.
For the balance of this essay I will tell the stories Rajan
and Zingales don't tell, the stories that make their own so
deeply flawed. In doing so, I will of course draw on their text,
taking aspects of their story and showing their alternatives.
And in doing so, I will debunk their argument. But I do so
sadly, for the world they envision is indeed a world that could
be realized. To realize it with the beauty they envision, though,
requires grappling with many other stories, stories that are
parallel to or intertwined with the stories they tell. It requires
probing the famously dark underside, in the way that sophisti-
cated readers approach the superficially joyous poems of Robert
Frost. And it requires exposing one blind spot in particular, for
Rajan and Zingales write with an unconscious class bias, the
exposure of which throws all of their optimism in doubt. They
are winners in the market in which they operate. It is often
hard for winners fully to appreciate their advantaged position,
and to have a meaningful understanding of the problems of the
losers.
17
THE BASIC ARGUMENT
The essential argument Rajan and Zingales make is one
that is both simple and compelling-compelling not only be-
cause of their clear and comprehensible use of economic theory
but also because of their often fascinating historical and con-
temporary examples, their artful deployment of economic his-
tory, their unblinking understanding of the policy implications
of their argument, and their occasional use of philosophy.' 8 The
argument is, concisely, this: free markets create opportunities
16. Id. at 247.
17. For an argument exploring the inability of American society's winners
even to begin to develop the imaginative tools necessary to understand the
plight of the losers, see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, STACKED DECK: A STORY OF
SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA (1998).
18. They suggest at one point that it is best for a system of relief for those
who fail to succeed in their capitalistic utopia to be selected behind a veil of
ignorance, drawing on the philosophical thought-device made famous by John
Rawls. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 301-02; see JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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for talented individuals to obtain capital to finance their pro-
jects. The market is, in a real sense, a liberator from the op-
pression of vested interests wh3 use their political clout to re-
strain product competition and, more significantly, this access
to capital. 19 Restraint of competition is not only deleterious to
economic democracy, but it is also often inefficient, as the
vested interests (the "incumbents" in Rajan and Zingales's ter-
minology) are not always the most talented and best users of
resources. It is only when these incumbents are made to give
up their stranglehold on capital, which requires state interven-
tion, that it can freely move to those who are best able to use it,
resulting in an economic climate resembling a true meritocracy
in which all can compete, and a more innovative and beneficial
economy for all.
This is true political economy in the style of Smith, Ri-
cardo, Marx, Veblen, and Schumpeter-a style practiced before
Rajan and Zingales's colleagues at the University of Chicago
turned micro-economics into an almost exclusively quantitative
and arid discipline, devoid of history, context, and humanity.
And, indeed, politics is very much at the heart of Rajan and
Zingales's argument. Contrary to libertarian arguments that
free markets will spontaneously arise and flourish in the ab-
sence of governmental intervention, Rajan and Zingales see
quite the opposite. Free markets are, as they describe them, a
"delicate plant" that requires nurturing,20 by which they mean
protection from the political forces that will inevitably seek to
destroy them. In order to maintain free markets, governmental
regulation is, to a point at least, necessary. Governmental in-
frastructure creates the environment in which markets can
flourish-governmental regulation creates an even playing
field, sets the ground rules for competition, and breaks apart
monopolies.
The reason that free markets are so fragile is, as I noted
earlier, partly a result of the power wielded by the incumbents.
Rajan and Zingales see another source of threat. Following
Schumpeter, they focus both on the creative and destructive
aspects of free market capitalism. 2' The creative aspects are, to
19. In this, of course, they follow Adam Smith. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 135-59 (R.H.
Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
20. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 277.
21. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2d ed. 1947). They do, however, seem to disregard Schumpeter's conclusion
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THE AGE OF AQUARIUS
them, fairly obvious. It is the destructive aspects that require
more attention. For not only do businesses fail in a rough and
tumble free market competition, but people get hurt. While or-
dinarily the people most hurt by the free market, the losers in
the competition, lack the political organization and clout to re-
strain or remediate the destructive effects of the market in
times of crisis, which inevitably occur in free market environ-
ments-stock market crashes, depressions, bank failures, cur-
rency crises, bankruptcies, massive layoffs, and the like2 -the
very scope of the crisis brings it to broad public attention. At
times like these, the losers can coordinate on the publicity sur-
rounding the particular failure and overcome the ordinary col-
lective action problem which precludes their quotidian inability
to take political action. Crises provide a mechanism that allows
them to unite to compel governmental intervention to alleviate
their suffering, intervention which generally results in con-
straints on the market. This is exactly the time that the power
of the incumbents is most powerfully deployed as well, because
they can use the protests as cover to lobby for "reforms," osten-
sibly in the public interest but that will invariably restrict
competition in both product and capital markets in their favor.
Rajan and Zingales's example of the effect of the 1933 and 1934
United States securities acts as protective legislation for the
investment banking industry 3 is a fascinating revisionist take
on this well-worn subject.
For all of this, the book is essentially, although rather sub-
tly, a tract in favor of globalization. While Rajan and Zingales
conclude with a number of solutions to the problems they pose,
two cures are central to their argument: open borders with re-
spect to trade and, more importantly, open borders with respect
to capital.24 It is only when a critical mass of nations keeps
their borders open that domestic governments remain unable,
except to their obvious economic detriment, to cave in to the
demands of the incumbents and the losers to restrict competi-
tion.25 Thus, the true savior of the free market is a world econ-
omy, unimpeded by currency restrictions, barriers to cross-
that capitalism ultimately will destroy itself. Id. at 162.
22. For the leading historical account of these phenomena, see CHARLES
P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES (4th ed. 2000).
23. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 222.
24. Id. at 182-91.
25. Id.
2004]
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border lending and securities trading, restrictive tariffs, and
the like.26
There is a charmingly Jeffersonian adjunct to the global so-
lution they seek: firms should be kept relatively small, at least
small enough to sterilize their inchoate political power. To this
end they are vigorous advocates of enforcement of the antitrust
laws.27 The world that will result from all of this is, as they see
it, a world of yeoman industrialists and entrepreneurs, with far
more equitable global economic distribution than currently ex-
ists, and a world made safe for capitalism (and, implicit in their
argument, for democracy).
This, in a nutshell, is their story. It is a story I want to be-
lieve. But despite their sensitivity to the need to protect the
losers (as much to keep them from rising up against the market
as for any philosophical reasons), it remains a story that is in-
complete. When alternative tales are told, the story becomes far
less compelling.
THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC DANGERS
OF FINANCE THEORY
Finance theory itself is a significant hero in Rajan and
Zingales's story. Since this is, after all, a book about finance,
the topic provides a nice point of departure. From Harry
Markowitz's development of portfolio theory to efficient market
theory and the capital asset pricing model, Rajan and Zingales
see modern finance theory as the principal instrument of mar-
ket liberation.' There can be little question that modern fi-
nance theory has catalyzed investment strategies that encour-
age portfolio diversification. The concomitant spread of finance
throughout the capitalist world has enabled dramatically
higher numbers of people to participate in the capital markets
as investors, reaping the rewards in their individual portfolios
and pension funds through the media of institutional investors
like mutual funds and pension funds.29
26. Id.
27. Id. at 296.
28. Id. at 45-48.
29. In 2001, banks, insurance companies, private and public pension
funds, and mutual funds owned approximately 48% of all U.S. equities.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 tbl.1173 (2002) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
20021. Despite the celebration of widespread stock ownership in the United
States (about half of all families own equity of some kind, see id. at tbl.1186),
[Vol 88:921
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There is, however, a dark side to finance theory, for it has
produced collateral consequences, almost certainly unintended,
that threaten democracy on two fronts. The first is the enor-
mous concentration of capital in the hands of institutional in-
vestors.0 The second is the detachment of the entire concept of
investing from the ultimate investment vehicle-the corpora-
tion itself-and the creation of "the market" as the object of in-
terest, thus increasing the power of corporate managers to act
with little restraint except in the pursuit of higher profits by
31
whatever means necessary.
The story of capital concentration is a simple one. When
Markowitz developed portfolio theory, approximately seven
percent of the American population held stock in any form and
the mutual fund was a virtually unknown quantity.32 But the
logic of that theory led, in the late 1960s and gaining steam
through the 1970s until the present, to the creation of invest-
ment vehicles through which individuals with relatively modest
wealth available for investment could achieve the diversifica-
tion that theory told them was desirable. This, of course, was
the mutual fund and, as defined contribution pension plans be-
gan to outpace defined benefit plans, pension funds developed
through which workers can direct their own investments to
mutual funds.33 As a consequence, and with the rising popular-
ity of the stock market through the takeover decade of the
1980s and the tech bubble of the 1990s, institutional investors
owned slightly more than half of all American equities in 2002.
The bare numbers may not be frightening. Where the story
becomes darker is the realization that the number of institu-
tions which operate these funds are relatively few. In 2001,
there were 8307 mutual funds in the United States managed by
only 266 mutual fund companies and 10,105 portfolio manage-
the fact remains that stock ownership is heavily concentrated in the hands of
the rich. In 1995, the top 1% of all American households (in net worth) had
30.3% of their wealth invested in securities, in contrast to the next 19%, with
18% so invested, and the bottom 80%, with only 4.1% so invested. Edward N.
Wolff, Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Household Wealth, 12 J. ECON.
PERsP. 131, 139 tbl.5 (1998).
30. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 74.
31. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 99.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1960 tbl.2, tbl.600.
33. For example, there were 8307 mutual funds in 2001, up from 3079 as
recently as 1990. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.1190.
2004] 929
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ment firms.34 While these funds have duties to their investors
to maximize profits, what should be striking is their concentra-
tion of wealth in relatively few hands.
Concentrations of wealth, translated into concentrations of
power, are precisely the concern of Rajan and Zingales. It is
these concentrations, they argue, that allow incumbents to
group together and restrict free access to finance by others. 5
Clearly the market power of these mutual and pension funds,
taken together, determines where much of the finance goes,
raising something like the very problem they are trying to re-
dress. Even individual institutions influence the market. So it
is worth asking whether the rise of these institutions creates
serious concerns, along with the benefits of providing cheap di-
versification.
There are other effects as well. Institutional investors often
36
own large amounts of the equity of any given public company.
While many institutional investors have not fully wielded their
muscle in directing corporate governance, others have. And
those who have, have almost exclusively done so for the pur-
pose of pushing managers to maximize stock prices.37 The in-
centives for this behavior should be obvious. First, a fund's per-
formance, and thus its ability to attract investors, is dependent
largely on its past performance. That performance will be re-
flected in the price of fund shares, which in turn is dependent
upon the prices of the corporate shares held in the funds' port-
folios. Consequently, for the funds to perform well, their portfo-
lio companies must regularly produce increasing share prices.
The other principal incentive for fund managers to push
corporate managers to focus on share prices is the way in which
they are compensated. Fund managers are compensated for the
most part on the basis of their performance each quarter 8 And
how is that performance measured? By the increase in portfolio
value. So every incentive created by modern finance theory is
for portfolio corporations to concentrate on maximizing stock
price.39 This is a problem because increasing stock price is not
34. Id. at tbl.1190; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES: 2001, http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/2001/
usfUS52.HTM (last visited Mar. 7, 2004).
35. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 1-2.
36. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 165.
37. Id. at 175-81.
38. Id. at 170.
39. Believers in efficient markets will not have a problem with this. But
930 [Vol 88:921
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the same thing as creating real corporate wealth through the
production of goods and services. One can readily see this in the
recent collapses of corporations like Enron and Worldcom that
lost virtually all of their market value and still have substan-
tial fundamental value based upon their assets. It is true that
the run-up in stock prices of many corporations in the late
1990s and 2000 meant that those who sold high had more
money. But these are really wealth transfers, not wealth crea-
tion, and hardly appear to satisfy the capitalist dream pre-
sented by Rajan and Zingales.
There is, after all, only so much that a corporation can do
to increase its fundamental value quickly enough to support
ever-increasing stock prices. Innovation, increased productiv-
ity, expanded markets, and the like all take time. For many
successful corporations, the road to increased fundamentals is
not linear; there are ups and downs. But a market composed of
investors who have incentives to punish corporations that do
not keep their prices rising is a market composed of corporate
managers who have incentives to fudge. Certainly, as we have
seen, there are incentives to fudge on the numbers, incentives
that one hopes the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200240 will diminish if not eliminate.41 At the same time, there
are also incentives to improve numbers in other ways, such as
substantial layoffs (guaranteed to get those quarterly results
up), cutting research and development, skirting environmental
laws, cutting product quality, and the like.42 It is not at all clear
that modern finance theory has served us especially well in
terms of the kinds of benefits Rajan and Zingales imagine.
Rather, the concentration of capital it has encouraged creates
perverse managerial incentives and is itself an inchoate politi-
cal force that has the potential to be highly destabilizing.
There is a second reason, beyond capital concentration,
that the consequences of modern finance theory are dangerous.
That is the way in which finance theory separates the stock
from the corporation, the market from the productive entities.
the evidence that markets are efficient has been shaken, not only by events,
but also by theory. For a good overview of challenges to the efficiency of mar-
kets, see SHLEIFER, supra note 5.
40. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
41. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of
Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189 (2003).
42. A more thorough explanation of this argument is provided in
MITCHELL, supra note 8, at ch. 5.
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Take the capital asset pricing model. By reducing a corporation
to its beta, it allows an investor to assemble a diversified port-
folio with the desired level of risk simply by selecting stocks ac-
cording to their betas and purchasing them in appropriate
amounts. Note that here the focus is the beta, whereas to a dif-
ferent class of investors, including day traders, market makers,
and specialists, the stock price is the significant factor.43 Either
way, the method of investing recommended by modern finance
theory gives the investor no reason to pay attention to the be-
havior of the corporation itself. While the concept of the ration-
ally passive investor has long dominated discussions of Ameri-
can corporate governance, modern finance theory essentially
takes the corporation out of the mix. What is the result? Enor-
mous multinational power centers with no accountability to
anyone (except to the aforementioned markets with the results
I previously described). Market discipline, which is favored by
some, is not enough when the focus of the discipline is to
maximize stock prices.
This separation of markets from production presents a po-
tential for real danger. We know that corporations are already
powerful actors in the political and regulatory process and,
campaign finance reform notwithstanding, are likely to remain
so. Without meaningful accountability for their behavior, ex-
cept to markets, corporate influence over the governance proc-
ess becomes an essentially unregulated and unmonitored po-
litical power center. In the case of the largest corporations, this
power actually overshadows the economies of many world gov-
ernments.
It is true that other control mechanisms exist. The product
market can, in extreme cases, discipline misbehaving corpora-
tions." But consumer boycotts are rare and often ineffective,
and only relate to serious corporate misbehavior when it is suf-
ficiently public, which is a rarity not only at home but abroad.
Thus the product markets will discipline corporations effec-
tively for substandard production, but rarely for social misbe-
havior. In addition, corporate political influence has, in the
past, led to administrations which underenforced antitrust
laws, thus further stemming the power of government to exert
43. Id. at 142-45.
44. For example, the predominance of "dolphin-safe" tuna illustrates
product market discipline. "Dolphin-Safe" Tuna, at http:/!
www.greenpeaceusa.org/oceans/tuna-dolphintext.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2004).
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control over corporate governments.
The courts can occasionally discipline corporations for un-
acceptable behavior, but this depends upon a government that
is willing to pass laws that regulate corporate behavior; strong,
well-funded, and capable plaintiffs; and corporate behavior suf-
ficiently extreme as to violate the law.45 Moreover, the influence
of corporations in the processes of government has led to the
appointment of probusiness judges.46 This further compromises
the possibility of reining in corporate power centers.
There are a number of other reasons why the fact that
shareholders are detached from their corporations by modern
finance theory and investment strategies creates dangerously
unconstrained power centers, not the least of which is the abdi-
cation by state corporate law of any meaningful regulatory re-
sponsibility. 7 I think that what I have outlined so far is suffi-
cient to suggest that the modern finance theory so praised by
Rajan and Zingales may well be at odds with their idealized
capitalism of smaller businesses and more widespread capital.
WITH A LITTLE BIT OF LUCK
Will talent be rewarded in this market utopia? Will capital
truly be available to those with drive and ability if only they
shall seek it? The sorry answer to these questions is probably
not. Probably not in the United States, and probably even less
in the rest of the world. Since the United States is as close to a
poster child for free markets available to Rajan and Zingales, 8
and since traditionally the United States has had the reputa-
tion of being the land of opportunity, one can reasonably expect
that if free markets performed a liberating function anywhere,
45. The recently vacated Ninth Circuit opinion in the continuing dispute
over Unocal's use of slave labor in Myanmar provides a good example. Doe v.
Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), vacated, Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628, 2003
WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003).
46. Cf. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 670-84 (1974) (detailing the judicial development
of Delaware's probusiness state law).
47. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 126-28.
48. This is a fairly recent development. They date the beginning of the
modern rise of finance in the United States to the 1980s. RAJAN & ZINGALES,
supra note 1, at 192-93; RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GREAT
REVERSALS: THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
(Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 526, 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=236100 (June 2001).
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it would be here. While free markets have made capital avail-
able based on merit to some extent (and that extent is the sub-
ject of the next section), that extent is rather limited and, for
several important reasons, is likely to remain so.
The battle over equality of opportunity versus equality of
circumstance is a classic fight among egalitarians. 9 The Age of
Aquarius is a world of equal opportunity. So the question must
be asked whether free markets will really equalize opportunity
among Americans. The statistical data suggest that, however
free the American capital markets, something is amiss. The
United States has the highest Gini coefficient in the developed
world" and the gap between rich and poor has continued to
grow in terms of wealth.51 The same reality pertains to income.
While the data show that some American families have moved
up a notch on the economic scale, they are relatively few.52
While it is also true that poverty rates have stayed about the
same over the past thirty years,5" there is significant contro-
49. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dworkin, What Is Equality?, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
185 (1981); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A
Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1687 (1986); David A. Strauss, The
Illusory Distinction Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result,
34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171 (1992).
50. In 2002, the World Bank estimated the United States' Gini coefficient
to be 0.394. Thus, income inequality in the United States is higher than in
France (0.326), Belgium (0.246), Italy (0.306), Portugal (0.348), Greece (0.320),
the Netherlands (0.311), Norway (0.247), Canada (0.310), Switzerland (0.324),
the U.K. (0.354), and Australia (0.345), to name a few. Branko Milanovick &
Shlomo Yitzhaki, Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World
Have a Middle Class?, 48 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 155, 170 tbl.12 (2002).
51. According to U.S. Census data, the Gini coefficient in the United
States has risen steadily since 1975, with only brief improvements in inequal-
ity of wealth between 1993 and 1995. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF
COMMERCE, MEASURES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME INEQUALITY: 1967 TO 2001,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie6.html (Sept. 2002).
52. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that between 1969 and 1996, the
median income of households made of married couples with children increased
25%, which is significantly more than the increase in income for other types of
households. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHANGES IN
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 1969 TO 1996, http://www.census.gov/prod/
3/98pubs/p23-196.pdf (July 1998). However, when the earnings of wives are
excluded from those statistics, the increase in income is only about 2%. Id.
This suggests that the incomes of families of married couples with children are
rising faster only because of the increasing participation by wives in the work-
force.
53. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the poverty level has fluctuated
no more than a total of 4% in the last thirty years. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001, http://
www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-219.pdf (Sept. 2002). The poverty level did
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versy regarding the federal government's definition of poverty.54
Nonetheless, the most important fact is that earnings for those
in the true middle class-that is, at or around the 2000 median
household income of $42,15 1-have stagnated.55 Although there
have been slight increases in median income, the evidence
suggests that much of this is attributable either to smaller fam-
ily size (which might cheer environmentalists but poses signifi-
cant problems for the future of social security) or to the greater
incidence of two working partners." It is also worth noting
that, since 1980, the share of aggregate income received by
families in the top 5% has increased from 15.8% to 22.4%, while
the share of the bottom 5% has decreased from 4.3% to 3.5%.58
All this took place before tax cuts at the turn of the century,
which demonstrably benefited the wealthy. In fact, the bottom
80% of American families have seen their proportion of aggre-
gate income decline; only the top 20% has seen increases since
1980.59 Nineteen eighty is, by the way, an important date in
this story, for while some significant deregulation occurred dur-
ing the 1970s, the free market ideology that currently domi-
nates American thinking came into its own in the modern age
with the election of Ronald Reagan.
Turning back to the subject of wealth for a moment, as of
1998, the top 1% of Americans held 38.5% of our national
wealth, and the top 20% held 83.9% of our national wealth,
increase in 2002 according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Lynette Clemetson,
More Americans in Poverty in 2002, Census Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2003, at Al.
54. The U.S. Census Bureau continues to use a definition of poverty
adopted in 1969 that demarcates poverty at incomes less than three times the
cost of food (determined by a stylized conception of an adequate diet). There is
tremendous controversy over the continuing use of this measure, especially
since the cost of food has not increased at anywhere near the rate of other im-
portant factors in well-being, such as housing. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AN OPEN LETTER ON REVISING THE OFFICIAL MEASURE
OF POVERTY, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/povmeas/povlet.htm (Aug. 2000).
55. In real terms, earnings for the middle class is only $7,000 more than it
was in 1980, an increase of 17%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29,
at tbl.653. There are also significant variations by race and ethnic origin.
56. Id.
57. DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF
WORKING AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL "DOWNSIZING" 102-10
(1996).
58. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD SHARES
OF AGGREGATE INCOME BY FIFTHS OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 1967 TO
2001, http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie3.html (Sept. 2002).
59. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.659.
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leaving the remaining 80% of American families to split up the
balance (the bottom 60% of Americans hold virtually no wealth
to speak of).6 The trend has clearly been towards greater ine-
quality both in income and in wealth.
The irony is that this extraordinary disparity between rich
and poor (and the sheer inequality of a rich minority and rela-
tively poor majority) has accelerated during the modern period
most accepting of a free-market economy-the 1980s to the pre-
sent. By contrast, from the 1940s through the 1970s, an era
that Rajan and Zingales describe as one in which finance was
at a low point in the United States (the era I describe as the
age of hierarchy),6 1 both income and wealth disparities were far
more modest. Leaving aside for a moment the question of
whether a prosperous but more egalitarian society is better
than a wealthy but highly fractured society, these facts alone
beg the question of whether the free market is quite the oppor-
tunity equalizer claimed by Rajan and Zingales. In theory it
certainly seems so. But the data raise questions.
There are a number of alternative answers to the ques-
tions. Shaw's Alfie Doolitle unashamedly identifies himself as
62
among the undeserving poor, and happy to remain that way.
Or perhaps the 80% of Americans or so who top off at about
$80,000 a year and then plunge precipitously below that simply
are not willing to put in the work. But the facts belie this. Re-
call that much of the increase in "middle class" wealth is due to
the increase in two-earner families. Moreover, Americans
clearly are working more hours than they did twenty years
ago. 3 And, as I noted above, the poverty rate (however flawed
the calculation) has remained relatively constant. So sloth does
not appear to be the answer-we cannot blame the undeserving
poor.
Maybe capital is too expensive. As a matter of economic
theory, this should not be the case. After all, it is a basic tenet
of economics that risk and return adjust to set a rate of return
appropriate to the risk of the project.64 To the extent that tal-
60. Wolff, supra note 29, at 136 tbl.2.
61. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 194, 212. And I agree with the
observation regarding finance during this period.
62. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION 58 (Dan H. Laurence ed., Pen-
guin Books Ltd., 1957) (1916).
63. Chasing the Dream, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2003, at 62; Juliet
Schor, Why Americans Should Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A15.
64. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
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ented people who lack a track record seek financing for their
ideas, there are surely sources of funding appropriate to the
risks they present and the potential rewards they are expected
to generate. That does not dispense with the cost issue; risky
projects-either because they are intrinsically risky or because
the putative entrepreneur lacks a track record--cost more to
finance. But, as financial theory also tells us, the rewards gen-
erated by the project should be commensurate with the risk
and thus borrowers should be willing to pay the cost. Of course
there is some risk that they will not succeed (which is inherent
in the notion of risk), but, if financial theory were correct, tal-
ented people would be willing to take these risks in order to
reap the rewards. Finally, we have just come through a period
of historically low interest rates. 5 Even adjusting for risk, fi-
nancing has never been cheaper. Yet it appears to be the case
that those who would be most liberated by the free market-
the skilled, blue-collar laborer or the middle-level manager-
are content to remain in place, with wages stagnating.6
What explains this apparent passivity in the face of abun-
dant, available, and cheap capital? Perhaps it is gutlessness-
sheer cowardice on the part of the potentially financed entre-
preneurs. And there may be something to this. After all, most
of these workers have families to support and, at least for those
earning less than about $50,000, no meaningful wealth to
speak of.6' So there is a sense in which branching off on their
own means betting the farm, even if they have talent and ideas
that might well be successful.
Or maybe the answer is stupidity-they simply do not have
the talent or ideas or, more likely given the increase in working
hours, the time to think about them. Surely there are the plod-
ders among us at every level who are not inspired or even very
thoughtful. If this is the case, then it seems perfectly consistent
with free market ideals to leave them where they are. They
have the opportunities provided by the market but, like the
slothful or fearful, they simply choose security over the risk-
taking necessary to avail themselves of the opportunities. The
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 44 (7th ed. 2000).
65. David Leonhardt, Federal Reserve Lowers Key Rate to 1%, Lowest Rate
Since 1958, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at Al.
66. This, in fact, is the group with the greatest stagnation in wages. A
compelling account of this phenomenon during the middle 1990s is provided in
GORDON, supra note 57.
67. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.677.
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rewards of the free market go to those who are bold enough to
take the risks that ultimately contribute to all of our well-
being; that, after all, is one of the principal moral justifications
of the free-market economy, that it makes everybody better off.
If they are not willing to help, then they reap the rewards of
the passive.
It is not terribly likely, however, that we are dealing with
the failures of the stupid. Free market patron saint Adam
Smith, for example, trenchantly observed: "By nature a phi-
loso pher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a
street porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound
from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog."68 Train a
man to be a philosopher, and he will be a philosopher. Train
him to be a porter and he will be a porter. Train the porter to
be a philosopher and you have-well-Adam Smith!
It simply does not seem plausible that stupidity is the an-
swer. Nor does sloth, given how hard most Americans on the
lower end of the scale are working to make ends meet. The un-
willingness to take risk is a more plausible explanation, but the
reason it is more plausible has nothing to do with cowardice.
Something else is at play, and that something is luck.
It is not enough to be smart. It is not enough to take risks.
It is not enough to work hard. It helps enormously if you are
also lucky. Unlike risk and hard work, luck is unpredictable,
but there are factors which can help make the likelihood of luck
more assessable, and it is to these factors that I now turn in an
effort to explain why the Age of Aquarius is not likely to dawn
any time soon.
The problem that the free market ideal ignores is the fact
that it starts from a status quo of wealth distribution. Before I
go on, one might quickly object by noting that this is precisely
the problem that the free market is proposed to solve. Give a
person with initiative, intelligence, and resolve access to capi-
tal, and he will at least have as good an opportunity as anyone
else to make himself wealthy. That, as a practical matter, is the
best that we are likely to achieve.69 So the free market, seen
clearly for what it can be, is the great equalizer that Americans
have been searching for since at least Tocqueville's presenta-
tion of the tension between equality and liberty. Why shouldn't
68. SMITH, supra note 19, at 30.
69. I will not pretend to argue here for equality of circumstance, for I be-
lieve that in contemporary American society that argument is a nonstarter,
and you will see the argument merely as a pointless utopian objection.
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this be enough?
The reason is that initial distribution matters precisely be-
cause it sets up the circumstances in which initiative, intelli-
gence, and resolve can flourish. From a neoclassical perspec-
tive, these (at least initiative and resolve, if not intelligence)
are taken as preferences. Those who want to work hard and
take risks can; those who do not, get what they choose-and
therefore, in economic terms, deserve. Intelligence is a bit more
of a problem, but much of the kind of success that free access to
capital can bring does not depend on genius. You do not have to
be Henry Ford or Thomas Edison or Bill Gates to succeed more
than passably well, and theirs is not the level of wealth neces-
sary to make people better off in a free-market economy. You
can open your own store, your own plumbing contracting busi-
ness, even your own janitorial services company (and, in an age
of corporate outsourcing, obtain a fair amount of business) and
be considerably better off than you are working in a dead-end
job. So even intelligence falls by the wayside as a limiting fac-
tor for, given an average level of intelligence, the free market
still provides you with opportunities to improve your position.
The problem is that your ability to perceive and take ad-
vantage of these opportunities or even to have the confidence to
do so depends quite considerably on the position from which
you start. Sociological evidence is rather clear that the single
greatest determinant of your ultimate socioeconomic status in
our society is the socioeconomic position of your parents.70 De-
spite the American mythology of rags to riches, most Americans
grow up to occupy the same relative position as did their par-
ents.7 ' The second biggest determinant of your success, it turns
out, is the quality of your education. 2 Although educational
levels have been improving consistently in the United States, it
remains the case that there are significant disparities in the
quality of education available to disparately placed Ameri-
cans. 73 Nobody can quibble with the observation that the educa-
tion my son obtains in a wealthy suburban Maryland high
70. CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE
BELL CURVE MYTH 79-88 (1996).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. According to the Office of Educational Accountability for the D.C. Pub-
lic School District, the city-wide average standardized testing scores have hov-
ered below the national average for the last five years. For example, the aver-
age verbal and mathematics SAT scores of seniors in D.C. public schools in
2003 were 103 and 123 points below the national average, respectively.
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school is considerably better-really by leaps and bounds-
than the quality of education his counterpart in Northeast
Washington has available to him. Along with parental socio-
economic status and educational quality go other things: who
your peers are, their own expectations and their role in shaping
yours, the opportunity set you see available to you and those
around you, the time, training, and ability of your parents to
help you improve on your lot, and the like.74 All of these factors
determine the set of choices you believe you have, whether in
theory you actually have better choices (and poor education,
even with the successes of affirmative action, really does limit
choices). What determines where you start on the socioeco-
nomic ladder, the quality of parenting you get, and the quality
of education you receive? Luck. Nothing more than luck. So
even if one could argue that the free market provides equal op-
portunity as a matter of theory, cold reality intrudes to tell us
that it requires some substantial amount of luck in your initial
circumstances in order to avail yourself of these opportunities.
It is not innate sloth, passivity, or stupidity. It is not the choice
to join Alfie Doolitle's undeserving poor. In fact, desert has very
little to do with it. In the end, the ability of the free market sys-
tem to lift your particular boat comes, in a very real and tangi-
ble way, down to a matter of luck, and no amount of access to
capital can change this essential fact.
To be fair to Rajan and Zingales, they intuitively recognize
this. In a short penultimate chapter, they suggest some of the
preconditions necessary for a free market society to work in the
manner they predict (much in the way that John Rawls set out
the requirement of a minimum level of basic goods in order for
his principles of justice to be operative)." Their sole prescrip-
tion that goes to this issue, most of which is designed to allevi-
ate opposition to free markets by creating incentives for incum-
bents to support them, taxing inefficient uses of property, and
providing social safety nets for those who fail in the market
economy, is a lifelong educational system that permits people to
return to school at any point in their careers where they feel
they need retraining.6 Leaving aside the fact that in order to
return to school one has to have adequate schooling to begin
with, they do not address the crying need for economic redistri-
74. MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 17-28.
75. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at ch. 13.
76. Id. at 302-05.
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bution (except in passing and by comparison to some more
enlightened developing countries) in order to provide adequate
nutrition, health care, and education for all of America's chil-
dren and in order to help parents on the wrong side of the
tracks learn how to help their children succeed.
They are not insensitive to the need for social safety nets.
They do see the need for intergenerational accountability for
social security, for meaningful pension and health care reform,
and for the public provision of worker retraining.17 To this ex-
tent they are liberals after my own heart. But in glossing over
the dramatic inequities in socioeconomic status that currently
exist, they fail to make a case that the free market will really
open up the kinds of opportunities at all levels of society that
they claim it will. Instead, the picture they present is one in
which, as always, the rich will continue to get richer, some in
the middle will improve, and the vast bottom is likely to remain
where it is. The free market is not an answer until we create a
social system in which all members of society have a realistic
opportunity to avail themselves of it-when success becomes
more than a matter of mere luck.
THE MORALS OF THE MARKETPLACE-
THE ETHIC OF FEAR
Of course it is not enough to indict the free market simply
on the basis of initial distributional advantages or disadvan-
tages or by observing the role of luck. After all, these factors
can be minimized given the political will, and significant redis-
tribution, particularly of educational resources, as a price for
free market efficiency and opportunity may not be too much to
ask. So nothing that I have said so far should, in theory at
least, defeat the argument for the economic and equitable su-
premacy of the free market system.
Markets are scary. Markets create fear. Competition, risk,
and uncertainty are the stuff of which markets are made. While
risk can be assessed, uncertainty breeds anxiety and competi-
tion breeds ruthlessness. While markets also require some level
of cooperation with, say, the basic ground rules of the market in
order to sustain them, market theory substitutes the self-
interest of competition that mimics cooperation for true coop-
eration. Markets by themselves cannot sustain social capital.
77. Id. at 300-06.
78. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J.
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They can create the economic infrastructure of a society, but
they cannot themselves sustain a society and at some level can
be destructive of social networks and social well-being.
American society has lived through stages where the mar-
ket was a dominant force in social life, most recently in the
1920s. Even then, the kind of free market environment envi-
sioned by Rajan and Zingales occupied only a very small seg-
ment, the most financially elite segment, of the population.7 9
The market environment in which we currently live proceeds
on a number of different fronts, and absorbs pretty much the
entire American population. One front is of course financial.
The rise of institutional intermediaries that moderate the risk
of investing in individual stocks, defined-contribution pension
plans, and the allure of the 1980s takeover market and the
1990s tech bubble have, among other phenomena, raised the
proportion of American families who own stock directly or indi-
rectly to 48.2% in 1999.80 This by itself makes us more con-
scious of the market than ever (aided by the collapse of the
bubble and the corporate scandals of 2002). But it affects our
lives more deeply than that. Technology has made the financial
markets part of almost every American's daily life. Several ca-
ble television channels are exclusively or almost exclusively de-
voted to financial news, and others, including network televi-
sion, have developed a raft of financial programs. It is not just
Louis Rukeyser anymore. And since so many Americans now
participate in the stock market, this news becomes part of the
discourse of daily life.
Of course the Internet has also advanced the pervasiveness
of market society. New private securities-trading platforms as
well as online brokerages have put the capital markets at every
computer owner's fingertips."' Various Web sites report stock
price movements virtually instantaneously, and in case you
have missed something, Web sites like TheStreet.com deliver
daily market reports in your evening e-mail. Corporate infor-
mation is available through links to most of these sites, as are
analysts' reports, up-to-the-minute news releases, and investor
177, 194 (1999).
79. But cf. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 220 ("[The 1920s in the
United States had been a period of unfettered entry and competition...
80. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.1186.
81. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Structural Determinants of Stock Market
Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2004).
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chat groups that have proliferated." We live and breathe finan-
cial markets.
But the financial market is more pervasive than that. The
dominance of finance over management that characterizes the
last twenty years has led to deal making on a grand scale, the
kind of behavior that can favorably be described as moving as-
sets to their highest-value use and can more darkly be seen as
moving assets from hand to hand in order to make investment
bankers and management/stockholders rich.83 While it is hard
to dispute that the market for corporate control has salutary
effects in disciplining inefficient management, it is equally
clear even those transactions that are economically sound cre-
ate some of the destructive effects of capitalism: plant closings,
layoffs, disadvantaged bondholders, and preferred stockholders.
So everyone who works for at least a public corporation lives
under the rule of the financial markets and their mass move-
ments. Workers ignore the markets at their peril.
But markets in the American system are far more perva-
sive than that. Of course we have long been subjected to the
importunings of the product markets, but the market has now
permeated aspects of American life where either it never was
present or where its existence was subordinated to other impor-
tant institutional functions. Markets are like kudzu-they tend
to overtake everywhere they grow. From the booming market
for higher education, which is rapidly adopting the practices of
business,8 to the market environment that has pervaded the
family, 5 the market truly has become the essence of our na-
82. As of January, 2004, there were 2749 chat groups on Yahoo! which fo-
cused on investment-related topics. Yahoo! Groups, at http:l!
dir.groups.yahoo.com/dir/BusinessFinance/Investments (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
83. Rajan and Zingales suggest that finance really did not become impor-
tant in modern times until about the 1970s and 1980s. See RAJAN & ZINGALES,
supra note 1, at 68-76; see also RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 48, at 33-37
(describing liberalization of capital flows). They are at pains to point out that
the early twentieth century was the last time that finance really mattered and
that the leaders then (e.g., France, the U.K., Belgium, Germany, and Sweden)
are not necessarily the leaders now (e.g., the United States). Id. at 14-16.
84. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER AVERY ET AL., THE EARLY ADMISSIONS GAME:
JOINING THE ELITE (2003) (describing the gaming of admissions into elite col-
leges by high school seniors by manipulation on both sides of this market of
the early decision process); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization of the Uni-
versity: Distance Learning at the Cost of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 73 (2002).
85. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART:
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (20th anniversary ed. 2003); ARLIE
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tional culture.
How did we get here and what does it mean for American
society beyond our economic life? In little more than a genera-
tion, the structure of American society has changed, as an age
of hierarchy has given way to an age of markets. Social institu-
tions, from business to the family, have transformed in ways
that have kicked out from under us the old rules, norms, and
roles that supported our social order and an optimistic and
generous way of thinking about the future. While the age of
markets has brought new opportunities to those who were
marginalized or excluded during the age of hierarchy, it has
also brought with it the destabilization and uncertainty I de-
scribed above. 6 The more pervasive that markets are, the more
uncertainty, destabilization, and fear that exists. The rise of
market society has led American social thought to be governed
by an ethic of fear."
The ethic of fear is an'ethic of self-interest, self-regard, re-
sentment, and a lack of concern for others. And the ethic of fear
is, ironically, most pronounced in those who have benefited
most from the new age of markets, the winners in society. 8 The
ethic of fear has led to new norms, rules, and laws that privi-
lege these winners at the expense of those who have yet to
benefit-norms, rules, and laws that are cruel in their effects.
Because of this, the ethic of fear contains within itself the po-
tential to destroy the very considerable benefits of the age of
markets for all of us. The ethic of fear is not a necessary by-
product of the age of markets. It does require self-knowledge to
RUSSELL HoCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND
HOME BECOMES WORK (1997).
86. For a wonderful essay on the effects of market society on social char-
acter, see RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER (1998). For a
more polemical argument along somewhat similar lines, see CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1979). And for a classic and thorough examina-
tion of these problems, see DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1976).
87. I have been developing the ideas in this section in more detail in an
untitled book-in-progress. See also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND
IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932), for a polemic against the transformation of human
behavior in the context of capitalist institutions (among which, of course, are
the financial markets).
88. In the age of markets, middle managers with high-paying jobs are the
most vulnerable to being laid off and the least likely to find new jobs, making
them the most anxious about their future prospects for employment and fi-
nancial success. See Bill Montague, Feeling the Squeeze of Downsizing, USA
TODAY, Feb. 19, 1996, at 1A.
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defeat it. Rajan and Zingales suggest public awareness of mar-
ket benefits as perhaps the greatest barrier to the kind of mar-
ket opposition that can arise from the fear both of incumbents
and losers. 9 Their solution fails, however, to appreciate that
the logic of markets carries this fear almost as an automatic
corollary. More than simple public education is needed.
The development of the conditions that destroyed the age
of hierarchy and gave rise to this ethic of fear is easily under-
stood. Throughout the nineteenth century, and despite the op-
pression of African-Americans and the repression of women
and immigrants, Americans lived in a land where natural
abundance and growing industrialization created real opportu-
nities that were the basis for American optimism. Despite the
problems created by industrialization and its accompanying
urbanization, continuing economic growth and the reality of
open land gave some credence to the ideal of what my ancestors
called di goldene Medina, "the golden land."
Equally well known is the shift from industrialism to cor-
porate capitalism and the creation of the huge American middle
class, a process that began before the turn of the last century,
and the conditions of which were largely in place by the time of
the Great Depression.90 It remained only for us to recover from
that debacle to solidify, by the early 1940s, the age of hierar-
chy. This was a time of relative stability in our giant corpora-
tions.91 It was a time when the upwardly mobile moved from
shops and small businesses into the offices of the great corpora-
tions.92 Self-employment had shifted to corporate employment,
and work life took place within hierarchical structures, hierar-
chical structures that were mimicked not only in the new regu-
latory state engendered by the New Deal, but also in the
broader society outside the workplace. The stabilizing force of
that hierarchy was the middle class. 93
89. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 309.
90. One of the best accounts is MILLS, WHITE COLLAR, supra note 2. Dif-
ferent accounts of the same history are told in DAvID RIESMAN, THE LONELY
CROWD (1950), and WHYTE, supra note 3.
91. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 4, at 287-476.
92. Id.; MILLS, WHITE COLLAR, supra note 2.
93. The term "middle class" has been defined in multiple ways, and is a
constant source of debate amongst scholars. As a result, it is nearly impossible
to define this concept in a meaningful and concrete way. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Gorman, Cross-Class Perceptions of Social Class, 20 SOC. SPECTRUM 93 (2000);
Mary R. Jackman, The Subjective Meaning of Social Class Identification in the
United States, 43 PUB. OPINION Q. 443 (1979); Rebecca Piirto Heath, The New
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The age of hierarchy lasted for only two generations. Be-
ginning in the late 1970s and gaining considerable steam in the
1980s, America saw a dramatic shift from the age of hierarchy
to the age of markets.94 The shift was, in part, fueled by the lib-
eration-thanks to the Civil Rights movement and the Warren
Court-of women and minorities who had been excluded in the
age of hierarchy. These new entrants into the market brought
with them talent that, when given the chance, they used to de-
mand their place in the business and social order. But the
guardians of the hierarchy could not resist this increased sup-
ply of talent pressing against its structures. The hierarchy fell
apart under the pressure, and the age of markets was born.
The age of markets has brought significant benefits. Op-
portunities for those on the outside during the age of hierar-
chy-especially women, African-Americans, and other minori-
ties-have exploded. Antidiscrimination laws and affirmative
action tapped huge pools of unrealized talent and allowed it to
compete in the market. It has liberated those who had rela-
tively high places in the age of hierarchy from often oppressive
and dispiriting roles and created an atmosphere of excitement
and enterprise-both within and outside of big business or-
ganizations-for the skilled and talented. 95
But hierarchies, whatever their defects, are orderly. Mar-
kets, whatever their advantages, are chaotic. While hierarchies
demand norms of cooperation-even as competition for wealth,
prestige, and status takes place within them-markets are
driven by self-interest and competition-even as some level of
cooperation is necessary for markets to function.96 The destabi-
lizing effects of the transformation from hierarchy to market
litter the human landscape of twenty-first-century America.
The age of markets was first manifest in the business
Working Class, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 1998, at 51; Steven Manning, End of
an Era?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Mar. 6, 1992, at 2.
94. Rajan and Zingales date the postdepression recovery of economically
significant modern financial markets to the 1970s. See supra note 83.
95. Rajan and Zingales are well aware of this positive effect of the trans-
formation of markets. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 79-80.
96. The degree of necessary cooperation in the form of social capital seems
to vary inversely with the development of a functioning and efficient legal sys-
tem, although Zingales et al. conclude that finance is more predominant in re-
gions of high social capital. LUIGI GuIso, PAOLA SAPIENZA & LUIGI ZINGALES,
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 15-26, 28-31 (Ctr.
for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 511, 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=209610. As to this latter
point, they are appropriately reticent in making causal claims. Id. at 30-31.
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world, not only because of the newly liberated talent that
needed to be accommodated, but also because ideas about busi-
ness had changed. The transformation became apparent and
accelerated in the 1980s. It was a period in which the older sta-
bility of employment and career-long allegiance to particular
institutions began to crumble. Ronald Reagan broke the back of
labor by firing all air controllers who went on strike.97 The
takeover boom of the 1980s broke apart the giant, multilayered
institutions of commerce that sustained the hierarchy and its
layers upon layers of well-compensated managers. As the take-
over decade gained steam, it dismantled the conglomerate
structures that grew in the 1960s. 9" Moreover, in order to fi-
nance the process, the takeover artists destroyed a large num-
ber of institutional employers as their assets were broken up
and rearranged. This gave us the first demonstration of mas-
sive layoffs that were not offset, at least in part, by mutual in-
stitutional loyalties or strong labor unions.
By the early to mid-1990s, although the middle class re-
mained heavily managerial, we began to witness, for the first
time, massive white-collar layoffs, largely of middle-level and
older managers.9  The reemployment prospects of these workers
in the new market economy were diminished by the entrance of
large numbers of young people with more up-to-date techno-
logical skills, greater emotional flexibility, and lower pay re-
97. See Mark Levinson, Turning Point for Labor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
1997, at E15.
98. See Richard E. Caves et al., Fat: The Displacement of Nonproduction
Workers from U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1993 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 227, 243-44; Sarah J. Freeman & Kim S.
Cameron, Organizational Downsizing: A Convergence and Reorientation
Framework, 4 ORG. SCI. 10, 10-11 (1993).
99. See, e.g., Ann C. Crouter & Beth Manke, The Changing American
Workplace: Implications for Individuals and Families, 43 FAM. REL. 117, 118
(1994); Henry S. Farber, The Changing Face of Job Loss in the United States,
1981-1995, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS
55, 59, 75-77 (noting, however, that the increase in layoffs of managers in the
early 1990s may have been a one-time adjustment); Lori G. Kletzer, Job Dis-
placement, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 115 (1998); Stefanie R. Schmidt, Long-Run
Trends in Workers' Beliefs About Their Own Job Security: Evidence from the
General Social Survey, 17 J. LAB. ECON. S127, S136, S139-40 (1999); Robert
G. Valletta, Declining Job Security, 17 J. LAB. ECON. S170, S171 (1999); Perri
Capell, Endangered Middle Managers, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 1992, at 44;
Paula Mergenhagen, Job Benefits Get Personal, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept.
1994, at 30; Bill Stoneman, Merge-and-Purge Cuts, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr.
1999, at 24; White-Collar Blues, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 1996, at 29.
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quirements.'00 This was amplified by the burgeoning practice of
outsourcing to new, small, and highly specialized firms func-
tions (including middle-managerial functions like payroll and
back-office operations) that traditionally had been performed
within the firm.01 Fear of losing your job-a fear that was rare
among white-collar workers in the age of hierarchy-now be-
came a factor of everyday life. The ethic of fear had made its
climb upward.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the collapse of
the stock market as well as the deep and continuing recession
in the American economy, combined with the absence of tradi-
tional institutional structures, have left us with a free-for-all
market environment in which the survival imperative domi-
nates. The ethic of fear is the dominant social psychological re-
sult. The technology boom of the 1990s in its turn demanded
new and ever-changing skills, helping to destroy the job secu-
rity provided by the hierarchy, at least for middle-level white-
collar managers. 102 Technology and service industries have re-
placed manufacturing, overtaking the education, training, and
skills of those whom the hierarchy supported.0 3
The race for profits led corporations to massive layoffs to
undo the burdens of the age of hierarchy, first of the tradition-
ally vulnerable blue-collar worker whose vulnerability had been
enhanced by his loss of union power, and then of the newly vul-
nerable white-collar worker.104 The new market for talent de-
stabilized the hold of middle-class white males on the core of
the hierarchy. Technological advances made their skills and
ways of working obsolete. Now, workers whose knowledge was
their personal capital could move from job to job, from opportu-
nity to opportunity, as the flattening hierarchies of manage-
100. See SENNETT, supra note 86, at 89, 94-97.
101. These days, even doctors are beginning to be outsourced. For example,
there are about five companies in the United States that do remote analysis of
radiology examination results. Heidi Brown, Dr. Temp, FORBES.COM, July 23,
2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/23/cz-hb_0723medicare.html. These so-
called "nighthawks" receive the results of radiological exams electronically at
remote locations. Id. They provide quick diagnoses during the late-night and
early-morning hours, when many regular radiologists are reluctant to make a
trip to the hospital. Id.
102. SENNETT, supra note 86, at 89, 94-97; see also PETER F. DRUCKER,
POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 6-96 (1993) (describing a broader trend toward
knowledge-based work and its implications).
103. DRUCKER, supra note 102, at 6-96.
104. See Farber, supra note 99, at 59, 75-77; Valletta, supra note 99, at
S170-71.
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ment structures and the rise of thousands of new businesses
and new business specialties accelerated.0 5 Wealth, or at least
comfort, was the reward of those who flourished during this pe-
riod of creative destruction. The rewards to the far greater
number of workers who served this new knowledge elite were
more limited. They, as well as workers who remained in tradi-
tional industries, saw their share of the pie diminish.0 6 The
rewards of the market move to the most skilled.
Society in the age of hierarchy mimicked the workplace
structure. The new age of markets has brought down the social
structures outside the workplace to create civic and social op-
portunities for those previously denied them. Market-valued
talent supplants hierarchically supported place in all aspects of
society.
The critical problem in the age of markets is that we have
yet to develop appropriate norms, rules, and social structures to
accompany it, social structures that are necessary to bring
some stability and order, some measure of confidence and
safety, some assurance of fair play, some reason for optimism
and hope, to the volatile and chaotic market environment in
which we now live. We have yet to develop norms, rules, and
social structures to attend to those who fail in our market soci-
ety, for while markets value productivity, people value people.
We have yet to develop those structures in the workplace, and
outside it as well. The result is anxiety, resentment, fear, self-
interest, and competition without regard to others. The result
is the ethic of fear. And the ethic of fear threatens cooperation,
compassion, and fairness within our society.
Fear and the ethic that goes with it is an increasingly uni-
versal characteristic of the American character. Those who are
left behind, as they always have, live in fear. In the age of mar-
105. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & JULIE WULF, THE FLATTENING FIRM:
EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA ON THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE
HIERARCHIES (March 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid393684 (documenting flattened hierarchies in American business).
For an examination of the broad changes in American business methods, see
generally DRUCKER, supra note 102. Flattened hierarchies may well provide
greater income and advancement opportunities to the winners even as they
result in the elimination of jobs for others. See Ronald S. Burt, The Contingent
Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339 (1997) (applying network the-
ory, specifically structural hole theory, to evaluate the role of social capital in
contrast to that of human capital in promotion and advancement in larger or-
ganizations).
106. See DRUCKER, supra note 102, at 83-85.
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kets, fear has become even more characteristic of those who are
doing well-those who, in an always precarious market, know
that tomorrow their fates could change, that they could tumble
into the pit of the struggling.
The symptoms of the ethic of fear can be seen in all aspects
of American life. From the frantic competition of high school
seniors for admission to a small handful of elite colleges they
believe will ensure their success, 17 to the dominance of busi-
ness as the subject of higher education and the inculcation of
market attitudes on campus,"8 from continuing (if well-
concealed) male resentment of female colleagues, to opposition
of whites to affirmative action, from a business culture in which
anything goes, to the "fear factor" reflected in reality television,
to our social manners, and even to the market for the family,
the ethic of fear drives us apart as we compete to succeed in our
new market world. Solidarity-and the comfort and stability
that went with it-is an artifact of the age of hierarchy.
The age of markets may serve us well. Wealth has in fact
increased.'0 9 Few of us would want to return to the restrictions
and repressions of the age of hierarchy despite the charm of
Doris Day movies and Leave It to Beaver. In order for the mar-
ket way of life to sustain a confident, stable, content, prosper-
ous, and optimistic society-for it to sustain a generous soci-
ety-we must develop institutions and norms of behavior that
accommodate the new age of markets while facilitating fair and
healthy competition and providing order and opportunity for
those who struggle. Preserving the market by erecting a politi-
cal fence of consensus around it, as Rajan and Zingales pre-
scribe, is hardly enough.
Before leaving the subject, let me briefly summarize the
ethic of fear and its damaging effects. Rajan and Zingales ap-
pear to believe that the benefits of free markets alone, once
they are widely enough recognized and appreciated, will bring
public accord."0 What I have thus far said suggests that if they
are right, the public accord will be in the nature of false con-
sciousness, for the free market by itself knows no social har-
mony (although of course I recognize the need for social order to
107. See, e.g., AVERY, supra note 84.
108. See, e.g., Lieberwitz, supra note 84.
109. The gross domestic product of the United States increased from $527.4
billion in 1960 to $10,208.1 billion in 2001 (adjusted for changes in the dollar's
value). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.631.
110. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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sustain it, hence the false consciousness of the social accord).
The very nature of markets is such that much more than sim-
ple public education will be needed to maintain a truly decent
society.
The age of markets, arising with the collapse in old hierar-
chies, social structures, and stability, has been accompanied by
the predominance of the ethic of fear, a way of social thinking
and ethical reasoning that certainly has existed in earlier eras
but has now become widespread. In order to understand the
danger that the ethic of fear poses to the stability and welfare
of American society, not to mention our individual happiness,
we first need to understand the ways in which we reason about
ourselves in relation to others. I am not concerned with specific
questions of right and wrong, nor with any particular moral
tradition, whether it is based in religious doctrine, philosophi-
cal approach, or world view. Rather, ethics at their core concern
the way we interact with others, and the ways in which we re-
strain ourselves from pursuing our self-interest to the detri-
ment of others.
I identify two kinds of ethical reasoning, which I shall
briefly explore below, the ethic of fear and the ethic of confi-
dence. The irony of the ethic of fear is that it is most pro-
nounced at the level of those who have been successful in the
age of markets. And although it exists at lower levels of the so-
cioeconomic order as well, it is the successful who have the
power to act on the ethic of fear. The fear is a fear born of un-
structured, flexible, irregular, uncertain, leaderless, and ulti-
mately ungrounded social relations that characterize postcapi-
talist American society. The result of the transformation from
the age of hierarchy to the age of markets is that we have far
more unfettered choice than we have ever had before. The un-
structured nature of our choices, in contrast to the more limited
choices of the age of hierarchy, breeds anxiety, uncertainty, and
the instability of social and institutional relations. In short, it
breeds fear.
The ethic of fear is a defensive ethical posture. Those who
today are winners, who are dominant in the age of markets,
struggle to hold on to their positions in the winner-take-all so-
ciety. The ethic of fear translates into an ethic of self-
protection, in our laws, our rules, our norms, and our institu-
tions. The ethic of self-protection perpetuates the status quo,
leading the powerful to use that power to protect their posi-
tions. It withdraws social and institutional protection and con-
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sideration from the more vulnerable social classes, the majority
of Americans who are struggling to stay in place. As the protec-
tions fall, these Americans are also swept up in the ethic of
fear, seeking to hold on to their own positions by engaging in
self-protection and withdrawal from consideration of those be-
low them. Where competition and self-interest are the norm,
elements of social capital like trust and community break
down. This should be no surprise. The ethic of self-protection is
the ethic of the market.
What are the ethic of fear and the ethic of confidence? Each
is based upon certain concepts that stand juxtaposed with one
another. The ethic of fear is characterized by apathy, rationali-
zation, justification, and exculpation, leading to distrust, de-
tachment, self-protection, and ultimately communal disintegra-
tion. The ethic of confidence is an ethic consistent with
Enlightenment moral reasoning, the American faith of upward
mobility, and even postmodernist approaches such as feminism
and communitarianism. It is characterized by empathy, imagi-
nation, accountability, and responsibility, leading to generosity
and compassion. Each of these terms is explained in turn.
We begin with the core of our concern for others, contrast-
ing, as competing emotional styles, apathy and empathy. These
core terms establish the absence or existence of our concern
with others. Each of us is apathetic in some respects and empa-
thetic in others, but we are concerned here with the dominant
attitude toward others in our lives and our society, not specific
attitudes toward a particular person-friend, lover, child, ac-
quaintance, stranger, or enemy. Each person is different of
course, and all of us are more or less finely tuned to the inter-
ests of others in relationships which form concentric circles
from ourselves to the furthermost stranger. But we can, I be-
lieve, identify broad public norms and trends in what we can
describe as the emerging American character at the beginning
of the twenty-first century.
From apathy and empathy, we then juxtapose the reason-
ing styles of rationalization and imagination. While this must
be a more nuanced discussion, for immediate purposes we can
describe the former as separating ourselves from others and the
latter leading us to see ourselves in the others' place, much as
Piaget described the latter stages of moral development and
Adam Smith described the operation of our moral sense. Ra-
tionalization allows us to avoid confronting the concerns of oth-
ers while imagination-by putting us in their place-makes
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concern with their interests unavoidable.
From this dichotomy, we move to the contrast between jus-
tification and accountability. Justification follows rationaliza-
tion and provides conclusions for that process, allowing us to
deny responsibility for the effects of our actions on others, while
accountability follows imagination and leads us to recognize
our own complicity in their harm. This ultimately leads to the
distinction between exculpation and responsibility, the former
being the internalization of our justification and the latter the
internalization of our accountability. The former prompts us to
follow through on actions that harm others or to walk away
from them after we have done them, and the latter leads us ei-
ther to avoid harm or to offer recompense. Exculpation can also
lead to retribution, where we reverse the causation of harm
from our own actions to those of our victim, absolving us from
the need to worry about the other, while accountability can lead
to shame, regret, and ultimately to avoidance of future harm.
It is my contention that the ethic of fear comes with the
free market environment. Were we able to restrain markets
only to the appropriate sectors of society,11' the problem might
be less acute (although still present in those sectors in which
the market dominated). But, as I noted earlier, markets breed
markets, or at least that has been the recent history of the
United States. In the absence of consciously created social
norms and social institutions to counter the destabilizing ef-
fects of the market, society itself is at risk of becoming nothing
other than an economic arena. Like the citizens of Baghdad
who failed spontaneously to arise upon liberation and embrace
democracy, the American people (not to mention people in less
market-oriented cultures) are unlikely to rise to embrace the
markets simply because they have arrived.
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM
Related to, but distinctly different from, the story of the
ethical issues raised in market society, is the question of the
nature of capitalism itself and its various permutations across
cultures."2 As an Indian and an Italian who have spent a great
111. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
112. Neither they (nor therefore I) address the broader clash of cultures in
a globalizing world. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD:
How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD (1995); SAMUEL
P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CMLIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
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deal of time studying comparative market systems, Rajan and
Zingales are uniquely equipped to address this issue. And they
do. Many of the examples they use are drawn from a variety of
developed and developing nations, which they use to show the
difficulties in establishing and maintaining free markets and
the benefits of doing so (as well as the disadvantages that arise
when nations allow their markets to become politically con-
strained).1  But for all of their subtlety and sensitivity, they ul-
timately fail to escape the generally universalist posture of
their profession. For Rajan and Zingales, one size fits all, and
that size is free product and capital markets."'
Before I address the implausibility of this position, let me
point out one significant danger of the notion of one-market-for-
all. Cheetahs present a useful analogy. For a variety of reasons,
the African cheetah population is highly inbred, so much so
that each cheetah is more or less the genetic copy of every other
cheetah." 5 The result of this has been severe endangerment of
the cheetah population."6 To the extent that they are geneti-
cally identical, cheetahs are similarly resistant to certain dis-
eases, and not to others. As a consequence, if a particular dis-
ease to which they are not immune infects the cheetah
population, there is a pretty good chance that cheetahs will be
wiped out." 7 While markets are social and economic institu-
ORDER (1996).
113. They do, in keeping with the balanced view they present, acknowledge
circumstances in which market constraints become for a time necessary and
appropriate.
114. They do, however, recognize that different regional and social circum-
stances may affect the appropriate forms of business. See ALLEN N. BERGER ET
AL., DOES FUNCTION FOLLOW ORGANIZATIONAL FORM? EVIDENCE FROM THE
LENDING PRACTICES OF LARGE AND SMALL BANKS (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Re-
search, Discussion Paper No. 1976, 2002), http://post.economis.harvard.edu
hier/2002papers/HIER1976.pdf; LUIGI GuISO, PAOLA SAPIENZA & LUIGI
ZINGALES, DOES LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MATTER? (Ctr. for Research
in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 538, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.con
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=308569; GUISO, SAPIENZA & ZINGALES, supra
note 96; RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1. Zingales has also participated in
fascinating, if inconclusive, research on the effect of religion (and different re-
ligions) on economic growth. See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza &
Luigi Zingales, People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes, 50 J. MON.
ECON. 225 (2003). The study is not designed to determine, however, the nor-
mative claim of the book, that free and open markets are economically and so-
cially desirable.
115. See Sharon Begley, A Question of Breeding, NAT'L WILDLIFE,
Feb./Mar. 1991, at 12.
116. Id.
117. See id. Note that the inbreeding is also resulting in a greater propor-
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tions, not natural beings like cheetahs, the analogy obtains.
Take, for example, the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998.
Russia's trading and economic partners felt some of the effects
of the collapse pretty hard but were able to protect them-
selves."8 The same has been true of the Japanese economic cri-
sis which has persisted for more or less a decade.119 The world
economy is sufficiently global already that a bit of butterfly ef-
fect obtains, with the sovereignty of states over their own
economies as the principal protection. To the extent that we
create a world of completely open financial and product bor-
ders, it is worth at least speculating how much more severely
economic crises in one part of the world will affect others.
One answer might be that such crises would be signifi-
cantly mitigated by the ability of capital and products to flow
freely across borders. This openness would broadly spread the
effects of any such crisis throughout the world, mitigating its
effect in the country of origin and spreading the burden more
equitably on the rest of the world that engages in this economy.
While this might be both a plausible and equitable result, it
does raise the question of predictable governmental behavior
under such circumstances. How willing might a sovereign na-
tion be to absorb the economic problems of another? Rajan and
Zingales themselves cite the worldwide depression of the 1930s
as a significant cause of restricted trade and capital movement;
the closing of free markets was a protective response by indi-
vidual governments leading to the ultimately failed agreement
at Bretton Woods. 120 Could the open markets they envision be-
come infected, like the cheetah population, in a manner that
taxes the nations of the world so severely that recovery would
be difficult without massive international cooperation on a so-
lution (which would necessarily impinge on the sovereignty of
the nation in which the problem originated and entail the kind
of cooperation and subjugation of sovereignty rarely seen in
tion of male cheetahs that are sterile, so even if no disease gets them, they
may be doomed just because the population is losing the ability to replenish
itself.
118. Some places, like Britain, were hit harder than others. See Russian to
the Exits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1998, at Al. But see Fed Panel Considered Re-
versal of Earlier Rate Cut in February, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1999, at C4 (noting
that the Federal Reserve's protection of the United States was enough).
119. See Mark Landler, U.S. Gyrations of Little Effect on Many Asian Stock
Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2001, at C8; David E. Sanger, Case No. 3: Asian
Illness Threatening Vital Organs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Dl.
120. RAMAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 241-43.
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world history)? Some evidence suggests that it could, and that
the solution would be hard to attain. The European Union has
notably had trouble compelling its member states to comply
with their agreed-upon regulations. Great Britain still has
failed to adopt the Euro and Sweden has regretted it, signaling
that sovereignty and control over their own money supplies is a
more important value than pan-European cooperation. 21 And
France has on several occasions directly violated EU restric-
122tions on bailing out domestic corporations.
The benefits of the free market might well be embraced
during times of economic prosperity. It is hard to imagine that
in a world in which the sovereign state remains the primary po-
litical unit that it could weather even moderate shocks, let
alone severe ones, without taking protective measures. 2 3 But
another issue presents itself: whether or not it is plausible for
the world to accept one capitalism, is it desirable or even possi-
ble for it do so? In particular, is it plausible or desirable that
the world accept the particular form of capitalism most charac-
teristic of the United States? While they acknowledge in pass-
ing that other forms of more restricted capitalism preserve par-
ticular values (some degree of worker stability in Italy, for
example),12 ' Rajan and Zingales give short shrift to the cultural
particularism of the form of capitalism they espouse and fail
completely to address the effects that the universalization of
that form of capitalism might have on other cultures (or indeed
whether it will actually take root in different cultures).
Put simply, it simply is not enough to open markets, no
121. See Christopher Rhoads & G. Thomas Sims, Money Trouble: Rising
Deficits in Europe Give Euro Its Toughest Challenge Yet, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2003, at Al.
122. John Carreyrou, Saving a Company, Paris Sets a Pattern of Flouting
the EU, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2003, at Al; see also John Carreyrou & William
Echikson, EU Antitrust Chief Sues France, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2003, at A14;
John Carreyrou, French Bailout of Alstom to Get Close EU Scrutiny: State to
Take 30% Stake in Ailing Engineer Group Despite Rules Limiting Aid, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at All.
123. For more examples of noncompliance and alleged noncompliance by
European Union members, see Marc Champion & Christopher Rhoads, Euro's
Appeal Was Damaged by Slow Growth: Sweden's Veto of Currency Highlights
the Disparities Within EU Economies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2003, at A15;
Mark Landler, European Commission Presses Germany to Curb Deficit, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at W1; Brandon Mitchener et al., Expanded EU Will Be
an Uneven One, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at A16; Ryanair Prepares for
Negative Ruling from EU, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2003, at A14.
124. RAjAN & ZINGALES, supra note 1, at 244-45.
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matter how protected, and say you are finished. For in making
this claim, Rajan and Zingales give very short shrift to the dif-
ferent types of institutions (other than banks and corporations)
that exist in different nations, and the extent to which those in-
stitutions are, even if superficially similar, embedded in differ-
ent societies and cultures.125 They pass over the fact that mar-
kets-product, financial, or otherwise-are composed of
individual actors, and understanding the social networks and
cultural assumptions on which those actors behave is critical
for evaluating the desirability and possibility of one world mar-
ket.12' Even if one accepts their claim-a claim that is hotly
contested-that business actors (corporations) are converging
on what has become known as the Anglo-American model, ' 2
there are many other individuals and institutions involved in
economic and financial production in each sovereign nation.
Culture matters, and society matters.'2 8 So one can see their
story quite differently. In this section I shall give a different
and, in my view, more plausible account of the workings of the
economic world.
Rajan and Zingales might immediately object to this objec-
tion. They might, for example, argue that free product and
capital markets will, over time, cause the same kinds of institu-
tional and cultural convergences that they already claim have
occurred in corporations. Opening borders in the way they en-
125. They are not insensitive to these issues but they have explored them
more thoroughly elsewhere than in this book, and of course it is in this book
that they make the strong free market argument. See generally GUISO,
SAPIENZA & ZINGALES, DOES LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MATTER?, su-
pra note 114; GUISO, SAPIENZA & ZINGALES, supra note 96; RAGHURAM G.
RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, BANKS AND MARKETS: THE CHANGING CHARACTER
OF EUROPEAN FINANCE (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No.
546, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=389100; Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales, People's Opium?, supra note 114.
126. They are not, in general in the work, insensitive to the work of eco-
nomic sociologists, but for the most part choose to follow a more neoclassical
economic approach, giving the sociologists relatively short shrift. For a very
different approach focusing on the behavior of actors, see VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). For a similar focus from a different
perspective, see CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF
INSTITUTIONS (J. Roger Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997).
127. See generally William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Compara-
tive Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against
Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999).
128. See generally CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN
PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).
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vision opens cultures, or so they might say, and as people the
world over come to appreciate the benefits of the free market
their social and political institutions will achieve a kind of equi-
librium that facilitates free trade and finance. Of course, im-
plicit in this response is that the equilibrium point will be
something on the order of American republican democracy, for
it is indisputable that it is in the United States that the free
market ideal has achieved its highest realization. If this were
to be their response (and I do not know that it is, but the entire
thrust of their argument suggests it), then this is a far more
radical book than it would appear on its face. It is an argument
not only for globalizing democracy, but for broad globalization
of political systems-in other words, democracy-and the
norms and institutions that support it.
This argument not only seems unrealistic but downright
imperialistic, and since they did not expressly make it, I will
not answer it. Instead, I will address the more modest sugges-
tion that in fact free product and financial markets, with the
convergence of economic systems, regulatory regimes, and cor-
porate governance systems that they imply, are both plausible
and desirable.
The plausibility argument is fairly easy. It begins with the
recognition, well-established by economic sociologists although
largely ignored by neoclassicists, that the markets are them-
selves institutions, supported in turn by social networks, politi-
cal institutions, and local norms.129 To the neoclassicist, mar-
kets are simply the aggregate of bilateral transactions entered
into by market actors seeking to maximize their wealth. But
markets are more than this-they are more than the sum of
their parts. Institutions are, at a minimum, a set of rules fol-
lowed by actors, whether that institution is professional foot-
ball (American or the rest of the world's form, take your pick),
the Boy Scouts, or the securities markets.3 Each of these and
every other institution establishes rules based not only upon
the goal to be achieved by the participants in the institution,
but also upon the normative ideals of the rulemakers. That is to
say, while the end goal may be winning a game, or making Ea-
gle Scout, or making money, implicit and sometimes explicit in
each institution is a set of values, a set of ground rules, that es-
129. See generally Mitchell, supra note 81.
130. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations as Cities: Target-
ing the Nodes in Overlapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming May
2004).
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tablishes how one goes about achieving the ultimate goal. Now
it is certainly the case that some of these rules go to making
achievement of the goals more efficient, and that of course is
the interest of the neoclassicist. Institutional norms provide
other goals as well. American football differs from rugby in its
normative construct. I do not intend to insult rugby fans, but it
is a fairly uncivilized and unregulated game. Football, on the
other hand, while it can be quite brutal, takes a set of behav-
iors off the field that are perfectly appropriate in rugby. And
while we are on the subject of blood sport, fencing and boxing
are governed by a very strict set of rules. In each case, the
norms go not only to questions of maximizing the level of skill
(and minimizing the level of the inevitable luck) in the outcome
of the contest, but observe certain ideals of fairness and
sportsmanship. Rajan and Zingales understand the need for
rules in the market contexts in which they are interested. But
even as they understand and in fact advocate a level playing
field in the economic arena, they disregard the norms that sup-
port the institutions that support their economic actors. That is
to say, they disregard norms in other arenas.131
To join the issue on their own terms, while they claim that
corporate governance has converged, there is a large literature
suggesting that this is not the case and is not likely to be the
case either.132 There are reasons why what has variously been
called the Rhenish or Japanese system or coordinated market
economies differs significantly from the Anglo-American or lib-
eral market economies. 13 Those differences are neither all to
the economic disadvantage of the former, nor are they
grounded on economic considerations alone. Because it is the
liberal market economy Rajan and Zingales advocate as the one
world economy, it is worth stepping back for a moment to look
at the conditions under which those economies exist, again by
focusing on the most preeminent model of that economy, the
United States.
To play out the normative distinctions, I will step back for
131. Except, that is, for the generalized phenomenon of social capital and,
in a paper coauthored by Zingales and others, the effect of religion on eco-
nomic development. See generally Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, People's
Opium?, supra note 114.
132. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 127.
133. MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM: HOW AMERICA'S
OBSESSION WITH INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SHORT-TERM PROFIT HAS
LED IT TO THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE (Paul Haviland trans., rev. ed., Four Walls
Eight Windows 1993) (1993).
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a moment to one of the great works of twentieth-century phi-
losophy to which Rajan and Zingales make veiled reference in
passing: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice."' Whatever its many
flaws, what Rawls attempts to do is to set out the minimal
principles necessary to create a just political order in a plural-
istic and highly diverse society. What we get, of course, are the
two principles of justice, chosen from behind a veil of ignorance
(and hence the fairness of the title), the preeminent of which is
as much liberty for each individual without impinging on the
liberties of the others. The second, more controversial principle,
the difference principle, is about economic redistribution, and
while it is a vitally important part of Rawls's theory, it is sec-
ondary to the first principle, which is analogous to Rajan and
Zingales's ideal of free product and financial markets.
So we can see the ideal of free product and financial mar-
kets as a theory of economic justice (not to mention efficiency),
consistent with the way in which Rajan and Zingales present it.
Note that, like Rawls's principle, it reduces the economic world
to what can be seen as a lowest common denominator. Just as
equal liberty is at the heart of Rawls's theory, so equal oppor-
tunity is at the heart of Rajan and Zingales's argument. The
reason for equal liberty is that it allows groups and individuals
in a highly pluralistic society to adopt a basic principle upon
which all can agree, despite the very real existence of different
fundamental beliefs and value systems among a population try-
ing to find a way to get along. The reason for Rajan and Zin-
gales's free market principle is that by creating relatively equal
access to capital, it maximizes economic efficiency and there-
fore overall social wealth.
This ends the usefulness of the analogy. Rawls is trying to
create a system in which people can believe in different deities
and practice worship as they choose; pursue whatever goals in
life they find valuable, whether it be the goal of the undeserv-
ing poor, the porter, or the philosopher; make whatever life
choices suit them best (marriage or not, gay or straight, chil-
dren or childless); associate with whomever they like (Hadas-
sah, Augusta National, NARAL); make whatever political deci-
sions they choose; and the like. The purpose of the principles of
justice as a lowest common denominator is, in other words, to
allow a multiplicity of institutions, groups, organizations, nor-
mative systems, and life choices to flourish. Whether or not
134. RAWLS, supra note 18.
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Rawls's principles achieve this is not the issue. It is the goal.
The world of free markets as a lowest common denomina-
tor aims to create a world in which one value is protected: the
maximization of economic wealth. To be fair, Rajan and Zin-
gales appear to want to see a world in which the poor of both
developed and developing nations have the chance to become
among the rich, and clearly (and almost certainly correctly) be-
lieve that a world of greater economic efficiency is a world en-
riched by innovation and comfort. What they do not address is
the fact that one person's innovation and comfort-and, indeed,
one person's free market-is another person's oppression or ru-
ined community.
Leaving aside the debate over whether the liberal market
system or coordinated market system is more efficient, it is
clear that the nations adopting the former have different insti-
tutions and norms than the nations adopting the latter. Soci-
ologists show us that social capital and community ties are
much more significant and well-developed in the former than
the latter,3 5 that social welfare programs, the well-being of
workers, and varying degrees of community cohesion are more
prized in the former than the latter. Indeed, it seems pretty
clear that social capital like trust and community cohesion is
considerably lower in, say, the United States, than in Germany
or Japan. Of course these are not unalloyed goods; undue social
cohesion can, as it has in recent memory, lead to fascism, na-
tionalism, and totalitarianism. But leaving the extremes aside,
all one needs to ask to reject Rajan and Zingales's thesis is
whether it is plausible that the people of a nation might choose
values of community over the possibility of increased wealth.
Their failure to discuss any of the developing world beyond the
emerging European former communist bloc nations (with a nod
to British-colonized India and to Mexico, which, under NAFTA,
clearly is becoming part of the American market orbit), leaves
aside the entire Arab world, Africa, and much of Latin America.
Casual reading is enough to make clear that these are areas of
the world that might well be served by increased wealth or op-
portunities to create it. But casual reading also makes clear
that there are substantial numbers of people in the world who
135. J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic
Actors and Social Systems of Production, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, su-
pra note 126, at 11 ("All other things being equal, the more powerful the social
bonds among transacting partners, the more economic competition is likely to
be restrained.").
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have values that transcend economic efficiency. The fact that
these values might not always be desirable (Palestinian re-
venge against Israeli occupation instead of building economic
infrastructure, for example) does not change the fact that the
idea that opening markets will lead people to abandon their
values, lives, and world views, for economic gain, is simply im-
plausible.
It is also implausible to think that even in those nations
that have adopted some form of capitalism (and it is here worth
noting that Rajan and Zingales seem to accept only one true
form of capitalism) that economic institutions are embedded in
social contexts and that the strength of these social contexts is
unlikely to yield simply because finance capital might become
more available. To put it in economic terms, what I have re-
ferred to as coordinated market economies resolve their eco-
nomic issues differently than liberal market economies. 136 The
latter coordinate largely on markets, even moderately regu-
lated markets of the type suggested by Rajan and Zingales.
This produces high degrees of generalized worker training and
worker mobility, little institutional loyalty, and managerial re-
sponsiveness to short-term profit incentives, to name a few con-
sequences. Information is widely disseminated, but not deep,
and this implies diversification of financial holdings as well. By
contrast, coordinated market economies coordinate on rela-
tional contracting, not only in the supply and product markets
but in financial markets as well, implying more cooperative and
coordinated strategies and higher degrees of trust. Among the
consequences of this type of capitalism are company- or indus-
try-specific worker training, coordinated among firms; high de-
grees of employment stability, retraining, and worker loyalty;
and managerial freedom from short-term market pressures. It
is also the case that liberal market economies generally have
significantly higher degrees of income inequality than coordi-
137nated market economies,  and it is not inconceivable that a
nation might choose greater equality over greater wealth (if in
fact liberal market economies do produce greater wealth over
the long term, a matter which is the subject of serious debate).
While some observers believe that liberal market economies
are, as a consequence of these and other considerations, more
adept at innovation, and coordinated market economies are
136. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 126.
137. Id. at 21.
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better suited to incremental innovation but the efficient and
steady production of capital goods,' this does not imply that
one form of capitalism is superior to another. In fact, if liberal
market economies are less likely to engage in technology trans-
fers (given their competitive market coordination in contrast to
cooperative coordination) and the efficient production of capital
goods, one can immediately see a good reason for preserving
different forms of capitalism instead of encouraging conver-
gence. The morphing of coordinated market economies into lib-
eral market economies may well produce a world system that is
deficient or inefficient in the production of capital goods. It is
unlikely that this would be a desirable state of affairs.
Thus far I have focused largely on the question of whether
one form of capitalism is plausible and desirable from an eco-
nomic standpoint. The evidence suggests that it probably is not,
and certainly suggests that the social embeddedness of institu-
tions means that achieving such a goal would involve far more
radical political, cultural, and social change in various devel-
oped and developing countries than Rajan and Zingales are
willing to recognize. But there are other reasons why one eco-
nomic world might be undesirable as well.'39
WEALTH: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
Throughout the argument, Rajan and Zingales operate on
the implicit assumption that more wealth is better. That is to
say, a nation (or a world) that has more wealth is better than a
nation (or world) that has less. I and others have refuted this
assumption elsewhere4 ° and therefore I will not linger on it
terribly long, but a few observations are in order.
In the first place is the very real question of the quality of a
society and its economic distribution. We have already seen
that wealth and income inequalities are far greater in the
138. Id. at 29.
139. Rajan and Zingales do not talk about some of the serious problems of
free market capitalism, at least at any length. Although they touch on the is-
sue of public goods, they do not, for example, explore some of the failings of the
profit motive such as the problem of orphan drugs. Nor do they examine some
of the perverse incentives created by free market capitalism; the recent corpo-
rate scandals demonstrate the consequences of an excessive managerial focus
on short-term profit maximization. See MITCHELL, supra note 8. To be fair, one
cannot discuss every issue, and their argument is fairly wide ranging. But
they tread too lightly on the dark side of the free market for their argument to
be completely persuasive.
140. See id.
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economies that Rajan and Zingales admire than those they
would reform. It is true that the free market countries tend to
have on average higher per capita wealth than coordinated
market economies or developing countries. But as we have al-
ready seen, that wealth is highly unequally distributed.
What does this mean for a society? Let us accept the (con-
troverted) argument that a liberal market society makes even
those who are less well off better off in wealth terms than they
would be in societies employing other forms of capitalism or
other economic systems. Wealth is a measurable metric, and
over time one might decide this proposition is correct. But how
do the less wealthy (which in the United States comprises some
eighty percent of the population) feel?
Liberal market societies are consumer societies. One's psy-
chological measure of well-being is dependent on far more than
the simple metric of absolute wealth."' One important factor is
the trade-off between work and consumption. We know that
citizens of liberal market nations work harder (that is, more
hours) than citizens of nations with other capitalist econo-
mies.' Statistics also suggest that the increase in the number
of families in which both parents work' may be a contributing
factor to the increase in the overall wealth in the United States.
Now this is not all bad. One of the benefits of market society is
that it prizes talent and ability instead of class, status, ethnic-
ity, or gender. Consequently, market society does provide
greater opportunities than societies in which social institutions
and norms are more restrictive. One can see this by looking at
nothing more than the opportunities for higher education
available in the United States in contrast to secondary school
tracking and limited higher education choices even in other
capitalist societies. The fact that more women work outside the
141. For example, the American Demographics' Index of Well-Being consid-
ers factors such as income and employment opportunity, productivity and
technology, leisure, consumer attitudes, and social and physical environment.
Elia Kacapyr, Trade Deficits and Well-Being, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1998,
at 30, 34.
142. In 1995, Americans worked 25.9 hours per week on average, compared
to 19.3 hours for Germans and 16.5 hours for Italians. Edward C. Prescott,
Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 321, Sept. 2003,
http://minneapolisfed.org/researchlsr/sr321.pdf.
143. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
the labor force participation rate of married women increased from 40.5% in
1970 to 61.4% in 2001. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2002, supra note 29, at tbl.569;
see also id. at tbls.568, 570, 572.
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home in the United States is a function in part of this increased
opportunity and freer choices. Women now occupy professional
and managerial positions in numbers that would have been un-
thinkable in the American age of hierarchy and that remain
unthinkable in some other societies.
But much of the increase in women working outside the
home is not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity.144 In
order to maintain standards of living as consumer culture in-
creases the variety of possessions that make one feel well-off
(not to mention as rampaging inflation in certain sectors like
higher education and housing make higher incomes a neces-
sity), families need higher incomes and greater wealth.' Espe-
cially in light of the stagnation of wages in the nonskilled and
middle managerial sectors, the answer has been for women who
might choose to remain as homemakers to work outside the
home. 46
The evidence that the increased stress that comes with
two-earner couples (at least when children are involved) and
the toll both the stress and the reduction in family time has on
the well-being of American families and the parental attention
paid to children is dismaying.147 Parenting is fit in when work
allows; children are often left on their own and even when
they're not, their time with their parents is carefully budgeted
and often provided for when the parents are exhausted from
work. Given the fact that the phenomenon is fairly recent, we
144. The number of women in the labor force increased at twice the rate of
men from 1979 to 1992. Judith Waldrop, What Do Working Women Want?, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1994, at 36, 37; see also Peter Francese, The American
Work Force, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 2002, at 40, 40 (stating that figures
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in December 2001 show that the
work force has become increasingly female); Watch Her Paycheck, FORECAST,
Oct. 1, 1998, 1998 WL 11241706.
145. In the 1980s, the impetus to women's entry into the labor force was
the need to supplement individual earnings to keep pace with inflation.
Waldrop, supra note 144, at 37. As families have become dependent on a dual
income to sustain their standard of living, women have continued to push to
remain employed in the 1990s. Id.; see also Diane Crispell, Dual-Earner Diver-
sity, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1995, at 32; Judith Waldrop, Myths in Progress,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1992, at 40.
146. I emphasize women not out of sexism but for obvious cultural reasons.
Very few men report that they are full-time homemakers and, as a cultural
matter that I believe needs no citation to anybody living in this country, men
do not generally see homemaking as an option except perhaps in limited num-
bers at the very highest income classes where the wife is employed in a highly
paid position.
147. HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 85.
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can't know for sure how the children of such parents will fare.
But it is not at all clear that the future of America is bright
with children whose upbringing exists in the interstices of their
parents' work.
There is another downside to the society engaged in the
pursuit of wealth. As I noted, psychological well-being is at
least as important a factor as physical well-being. In a con-
sumer society (a society in search of wealth and acquisition),
what matters most is not whether you can provide for your ba-
sic needs but your sense of your material status in relationship
to others. Stuff matters, and members of a consumer society
spend much of their time in pursuit of stuff. All one has to do to
see this in the United States is to note the proliferation of life-
style magazines, largely devoted to advertisements and articles
on how material possessions can improve your lifestyle. An un-
scientific observation of the trend of even The New York Times
and its magazine over the course of the last several decades re-
veals whole new sections devoted to lifestyles, and in particular
the lifestyles of the wealthy. It does not require science to show
that we are increasingly obsessed with consumption.
What is the social impact of this? The Greeks called it
pleionexia-grasping. As free market culture proliferates, the
tendency is for people to become ever more grasping in the ac-
quisition of wealth and the things it can buy. This adds another
level of competition to market society, and distorts the devel-
opment of social capital even further. For a society in which the
members spend their time trying to outdo one another or sit in
envy of others is a society in which trust and cooperation are
likely to dissipate. Aristotle referred to the grasping man as un-
just, perhaps the worst accusation he was capable of levying,
for justice consists in part of accepting one's due. 148 If we all
come to feel that everything is our due, our behavior towards
others will increasingly resemble Aristotelian injustice. And
while his is not necessarily the last word on what is just, it is
pretty clear that such attitudes are damaging to society.
Wealth itself as a value is a questionable proposition. As I
noted earlier, I am not going to address this in any detail since
I have done so previously. But in the context of this essay, the
question stands out because different capitalist countries (not
to mention developing countries) or, better put, societies, place
148. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 159 (Christopher Rowe
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
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different values on the trade-off between wealth and other as-
pects of life, such as leisure time, avocational pursuits, commu-
nity activism, and economic stability. Thus it is not at all clear
that any given society would choose wealth maximization as its
organizing value even if persuaded that the free market is the
goal to achieving it. Again, Rajan and Zingales at least give a
nod to the value of economic stability prized by certain types of
capitalism (Italian capitalism is cited as an example), but the
question of whether wealth should be the one world value (not
to mention whether it even is a value) is nowhere on the table.
WHOSE CAPITALISM?
Read with a slightly jaundiced but hopeful eye, Rajan and
Zingales's story presents an unduly optimistic, American-
centered, and slightly class-biased account of the beauties of
the free market. What I have tried to suggest is that the flaws
in the capitalism they idealize are serious and real, and are
unlikely to be redressed by their brief policy recommendations.
More important is the understanding that capitalism is a
many-splendored thing, varying with cultures and societies,
and serving not only economic goals but other social goals as a
particular nation chooses to balance them. As long as we live in
a multicultured world, we will have multicultured capitalisms.
The fact that some might not produce as much wealth as oth-
ers, might not be as financially open as others, or might not be
as innovative as others, ought not to condemn them to the
dustbin of economic history. A realistic appraisal of potential
capitalism requires an equally realistic appraisal of what we
mean by capitalism, and what values we reserve to the markets
and what values we do not. The story, in other words, is far
more complex than even the most sensitive free market presen-
tation suggests.
20041
